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Blakely v. Washington
Editor's Note: At the Senate Judiciary Committee July 13,
2004 hearing on "Blakely v. Washington and the Future
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines," witnesses from the
Department of Justice, the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
and the judiciary downplayed the seriousness of the
situation and urged caution in any congressional action.
Concerned that the situation in the courts was more
dire than the institutional witnesses had been willing to
admit, Professor Frank Bowman subsequently sent the
following memorandum to the Sentencing Commission,
the Justice Department and others. It analyzes the case for
a prompt legislative response to Blakely, with particular
emphasis on the proposal offered by Professor Bowman
several days after the Blakely decision.
TO: U.S. Sentencing Commission
FROM: Frank Bowman
RE: Legislative solutions to Blakely
DATE: July 16, 2004
I. Introduction
In the aftermath of this week's Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing, I am increasingly concerned that an opportunity
to stabilize the operations of the federal criminal justice
system is being lost. At the hearing, representatives of
the primary institutional actors in the sentencing system
- the Sentencing Commission, the Justice Department,
and the judiciary - all expressed the view that the federal
criminal system is not in "crisis" as a result of Blakely v.
Washington, and that Congress need not act immediately
to pass legislation in response to that decision. While I
understand and sympathize with the caution that pro-
duced those sentiments, the confidence expressed by the
official witnesses in the ability of the system to handle the
current situation had a certain air of unreality. The essence
of the scene was nicely captured by Senator Leahy's in-
credulous question: "Judge Cassell, you say there's no
crisis but you just held the entire criminal justice system
unconstitutional?"
While neither Judge Cassell nor anyone else has
held the entire criminal justice system unconstitutional,
the Blakely decision is nearly unprecedented because it
affects every single case in federal court (not to speak of
its effects in the states, which are beyond the scope of this
discussion). Every case has to be sentenced. Even more
important than the number of cases affected by Blakely is
the fact that the Supreme Court has provided absolutely
no guidance to the lower courts about how to handle the
situation. Unless we understand how sentencing is to
be conducted, the parties cannot meaningfully negotiate
pleas and courts cannot conduct trials, or at least cannot
do so with any confidence that the results will withstand
appeal. The degree of prevailing disruption is impossible
to fully catalogue, but is suggested by the fact that, three
weeks after Blakely, we have four circuit court opinions
about Blakely reaching four different results and districts
such as Utah where four district judges have reached
four different conclusions (which incidentally are not
the same four reached by the circuit courts). And the
judicial disagreements which have surfaced so far deal
almost exclusively with cases where guilt has already been
determined - courts haven't even begun to address the
problems of applying Blakely to cases pending trial or
plea.
In short, with apologies to Judge Sessions, the sky is
falling, at least as much as legal skies can. The question ad-
dressed in this memorandum is whether some legislative
solution is a desirable response.
I think that part of the reluctance to move forward with
an immediate legislative response stems from a failure
to map out the most likely consequences in the near and
middle term of the available options. This memo attempts
to provide such a map..
II. Option 1: Let the Supreme Court and the lower courts
solve the problem
The Supreme Court created this mess by deciding Blakely,
but failing to determine its applicability to the federal
sentencing guidelines and failing to give even general
guidance about how the newly announced constitutional
regime is supposed to be administered. It is the Court's
omissions even more than the Blakely decision itself
that are causing disruption. Thus, it is not unnatural
for everyone else to want further guidance from the
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Court before making any definitive move. And at least
some voices in the current debate seem to be suggesting
that the courts as an institution can work through the
problems created by Blakely and arrive by common law
development at a new sentencing regime. This seems to
me highly unrealistic.
First, even waiting for the Supreme Court to clarify the
situation has two significant drawbacks:
(I) There is no guarantee that the Court will move
expeditiously. Indeed, it is very likely that no
decision will be forthcoming from the Court until
at least November. The Court is in recess. Its new
term does not begin until October. It could order
an extraordinary procedure of expedited briefing
and argument before October, but so far shows no
indication that it will. Even if the Court grants
certiorari and places a Blakely case on the argu-
ment calendar for the first week in October, given
the difficulty of the issues and their far-reaching
effects, it is doubtful that an opinion would issue
before sometime in November, and it might well
take longer - perhaps into the spring.
(2) When a decision comes, it will probably not help
very much. Presumably, the Court will decide
once and for all whether Blakely applies to the
Guidelines (though one can envision 4-1-4
decisions that leave even that basic question in
some doubt). The answer to the basic question
would be helpful to know; however, with the sole
exception of the Fifth Circuit, every other court
already assumes that Blakely applies. The hard
part is figuring out what to do about it - and
there is no guarantee whatever that the Court will
provide any meaningful advice on how to make a
post-Blakely world work. Indeed, given the
Court's performance in Blakely itself, despite the
plea of the dissenters for some attention to
practical questions, there is every reason to
suspect that the Court will find Blakely applicable
to the Guidelines and leave the details to the rest
of us. And even if the Court wanted to be helpful,
the number of issues raised by Blakely is so large
that it is difficult to imagine a test case that would
present even a significant fraction of them in a
form ripe for review. In which event, from a
practical point of view, we will be little better off
after a Court decision than we are right now.
Second, because the issues presented by Blakely are
so complex and the process of resolving them through
litigation so slow, the idea that courts can solve the problem
without legislation is an illusion, at least unless we are
prepared to accept a state of constant roiling uncertainty
for several years to come.
Ill. Option 2: Wait for the Supreme Court and then
legislate
If one is going to legislate, it would be nice to have some
guidance from the Supreme Court, at least on the funda-
mental issue of whether Blakelyapplies to the Guidelines.
However, as noted above, getting that guidance will prob-
ably take months, perhaps many months, and when the
guidance comes, it may not be very detailed. Of equal
practical importance is the fact that any decision by the
Court would probably come at a time in the legislative
calendar when prompt responsive action will probably be
impossible.
If the Court renders a decision in late November, we
will have a lame-duck Congress with only a few weeks of
legislative life remaining, and perhaps a lame-duck Ad-
ministration. Thus, the prospects for remedial legislation
before the opening of a new session of Congress in January
2005 would appear dim. Given the inevitable dislocation
surrounding post-election congressional reorganizations
(and possibly the installation of a new Administration),
legislation probably would not go forward until February
2005 or even later.
In my Senate testimony, I suggested that it might be
advisable to wait at least a week or two to see if the Supreme
Court might take extraordinary action. On reflection, and
having been reminded of the congressional calendar, I
now think this suggestion was impractical. As a practical
matter, if legislation does not proceed by roughly Friday,
July 23, 2004, Congress will go on its August recess and
will not be able to consider legislation until after Labor Day.
At that point, if the Supreme Court has accepted certiorari
and set argument on a Blakely case for early October, the
chorus of voices suggesting delay will grow louder - even
though, as demonstrated above, a Supreme Court decision
is likely to come too late and be too uninformative to be of
much help.
IV. Option 3: Legislate now
The following discussion focuses primarily on the partic-
ular legislative suggestion I have put forward, with some
passing mention of the other prominent options. It will
address the principal objections I have heard to acting
promptly:
A. Should we layer another potentially
unconstitutional system on top of the current one?
A number of people have voiced the concern that the
current confusion might be made worse by passing an
interim legislative fix. This is not, on its surface, an
unreasonable concern. However, it is of doubtful force in
the case of the proposal I have made. Three different issues
have been raised: (I) a new system might itself be found
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, (2) lower courts
might find the "fix" unconstitutional, thus compounding
confusion in the lower courts, and (3) the "fix" would
be different both from the existing system and from any
more permanent system later enacted, thus engendering
confusion in the administration of sentencing.
i. Constitutionality of fix itself The constitutionality
of the proposal I have made hinges on the
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continued viability of the Harris decision. If it
is impermissible for post-conviction judicial
findings of fact to raise minimum sentences, both
the current federal guidelines and the amended
version I suggest would be unconstitutional.
Although, various voices have suggested that
the Court might not only apply Blakely to the
guidelines, but also overturn Harris, this seems
to me unlikely. I concede that Harris seems at
odds with the emphasis placed by Justice Scalia
in Blakely on the importance of the jury as indis-
pensable sentencing fact-finder. However, Harris
was equally at odds with the spirit of Apprendi, a
point which did not deter the Court, including
Justice Scalia from deciding Harris as it did.
It seems to me, and I think to most seasoned
observers of the Court, at the least unlikely that
the Justices would reverse themselves only two
years after Harris. I believe the likelihood of
reversal decreases if the occasion for revisiting
Harris was a review of a piece of congressional
legislation passed in express reliance on Harris.
For the Court to flip-flop in that setting would be
so obviously political a response as to cast its own
institutional integrity as a non-political interpreter
of the Constitution into serious question.
Moreover, particularly if one is concerned about
the continuing viability of Harris, it seems to me
better to legislate a Harris-based fix now, rather
than after the Court addresses the applicability of
Blakelyto the current guidelines. As matters stand,
the Court is quite likely to render a decision finding
the guidelines unconstitutional because they
operate by raising the tops of sentencing ranges,
but not addressing the Harris issue. If the Court
knows that the replacement for the Guidelines
depends on the validity of Harris, they would
have some incentive to address the continuing
vitality of Harris immediately, rather than leaving
that question hanging. Moreover, since any
challenge to the current guidelines necessarily
raises the Harris question - because under
the current guidelines post-conviction judicial
findings of fact raise sentencing ranges which
have both tops and bottoms - the Court could
address the Harris question without waiting for a
case arising under the newly enacted statutory fix.
2. Lower courts might find the Fix unconstitutional:
Even if the High Court ultimately refused to recede
from Harris and found the fix constitutional,
there would undoubtedly be litigation in the
lower courts in which defendants argued
that the fix was unconstitutional because Harris
should not survive. Constitutional challenges will
be an unavoidable concomitant of any legislative
response to Blakely. The important question is not
whether such arguments will be made, but whether
they are likely to be successful in any more than a
handful of aberrant cases. I think the answer here is
no. Until Harris is overturned by the U.S. Supreme
Court, it remains the law of the land. A few
lower court judges may get adventurous and find
Harris no longer good law, but the overwhelming
majority will follow the law as it exists
until directed otherwise by the Supreme Court.
3. We should avoid having three different systems in
quick succession: The most intuitively appealing
objection to changing the law now is the general
proposition that having three sentencing systems
in quick succession - the guidelines, an interim
legislatively created system, and a permanent
revised system that emerges after the Court
and Congress have had their final say - would be
more disruptive than taking no immediate action.
This argument would have force ifthe interim
solution were notably different in its operation
and effects than the current system. Thus, if
for example, Congress were to adopt as an interim
solution the "Kansas plan" espoused by the Federal
Public Defenders, one really would be faced with
three successive systems - the guidelines, the
Kansas plan, and whatever emerged at the end of
the period of judicial and legislative uncertainty.
The same could be said, albeit to a lesser
degree, of the proposal to make the Guidelines
advisory for one year while things get sorted out.
Indeed, the same could be said, with greater
force, of the option of taking no action at all. If we
take no legislative action, we will have, not three,
but many successive sentencing systems - the
guidelines, the multiple regional variations that will
emerge while the Supreme Court cogitates and the
Congress waits, and the final modified legislatively-
mandated version that will ultimately be required.
By contrast, the proposal I have put forward
does not suffer from this difficulty. Although it
modifies the Guidelines in a way that renders
them constitutional under Blakely, the proposal
would change virtually nothing about the way
federal sentencing operates on a day-to-day basis.
The sentencing process would be absolutely
identical to what existed before Blakely up the
point at which the sentencing range is determined.
Grand jury and pleading practice would be the
same. Trials would be the same. Even sentencings
would be the same. PSRs would be written.
Judges would find guidelines facts in the same
way they did before and apply the same guideline
rules to determine the final sentencing range.
The only difference would be that the sentencing
judge would have a theoretically expanded range
within which to exercise his or her sentencing
discretion. And even here, historical evidence
suggests that judges would sentence defendants
at or near the bottom of the newly expanded
ranges, thus producing sentencing outcomes
statistically indistinguishable from those gene-
rated by pre-Blakely guidelines.
Indeed, it is precisely the fact that my proposal so
completely preserves the status quo that has gener-
ated the greatest opposition against it. Folks eager
to radically reform the guidelines system fear this
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proposal because it changes nothing. And many
folks (not excluding myself) fear that instituting
a system that saves the guidelines in the short run
will forestall needed change in the medium to long
ran. I understand the force of the argument, but in
the end I cannot justify leaving the federal criminal
justice system in chaos for many months on the
uncertain hope that something better will emerge.
B. Does immediate legislation help solve the
litigation crisis?
If a legislative proposal does not materially assist the
courts in handling the current litigation crisis, there is
no point in adopting it. Both advisory guidelines and the
proposal I have made do, I believe, materially assist in
resolving the short-term problem. None of other proposals
I have heard do so.
1. Neither the "Kansas plan" nor the "guidelines
inversion" plan help in the short run
a. The Kansas Plan: The Defenders' "Kansas Plan" is essen-
tially a legislative version of "Blakely-zing" the guidelines
by converting guidelines factors into elements to be pled
and proven to a jury. Time does not permit a full analysis
of the complications that Blakely-ization entails present,
but among the difficulties are these:
" The government would presumably have to
include all guidelines elements in the indictment.
However, this is not certain. Perhaps guidelines
enhancements sought by the prosecution could be
enumerated in separate sentencing informations;
but if so, such a procedure would presumably have
to be authorized by statute and might not pass
constitutional muster.
If guidelines elements were required to be stated
in indictments, grand juries as well as trial juries
would have to find guidelines facts, and thus grand
jurors would have to be instructed on the
meanings of an array of guidelines terms of art -
"loss," reasonable foreseeability, sophisticated
means, the differences between "brandishing" and
"otherwise using" a weapon, etc.
Grand juries have hitherto been prevented from
considering sentencing factors, both because they
have been legally irrelevant and because many
such factors were thought prejudicial to the
defendant. Several U.S. Attorney's Offices have
begun considering whether it will be necessary to
bifurcate grand jury indictments and presentations
by presenting the "substantive" section of the
indictment in one session, and then, after the
grand jury has returned a true bill on the
substantive offense, presenting the sentencing
portion of the indictment with supporting
evidence.
" Since guidelines enhancements would be
elements for proof at trial, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and local discovery rules and
practices would have to be revised to provide
discovery regarding those elements.
* New trial procedures would have to be devised.
Either every trial would have to be bifurcated into a
guilt phase and subsequent sentencing phase, or
pre-Blakely offense elements and post-Blakely
sentencing elements would all be tried to the same
jury at the same time.' There is now no provision
in federal statutes or rules for bifurcated
sentencing proceedings, except in capital cases,
and there is at least some doubt that such
bifurcated trials would even be legal in the absence
of legislation authorizing them.
* If a unitary system of trial were adopted, the judge
would be required to address motions to dismiss
particular guidelines elements at the close of the
government's case and of all the evidence, before
sending to the jury all guidelines elements that
survived the motions to dismiss.
* In either a unitary or bifurcated system, the judge
would be obliged to instruct the jury on the
cornucopia of guidelines terms and concepts, and
the jury would have to produce detailed special
verdicts.
The prospect of redesigning pleading rules, discovery
and motions practice, evidentiary presentations, jury
instructions, and jury deliberations to accommodate the
manifold complexities of the Guidelines should give any
practical lawyer pause. Judges alone could not effect the
transformation. Legislation and Sentencing Commission
action would almost certainly be required to modify the
Sentencing Reform Act, the Guidelines, and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to accommodate the new
model, a process that would take months or years to
accomplish. In the interim, uncertainty would be endemic.
In short, Blakely-izing the guidelines either by legisla-
tive fiat or through legislative inaction is not a solution to
the short-term litigation problem.
b. The Guidelines inversion plan: Various persons have
suggested that a post-Blakely sentencing scheme could be
created by making all defendants presumptively subject
to the statutory maximum sentence which would be
reduced upon proof of enumerated mitigating factors. I
have the gravest doubts about such a proposal, even for
the long term. But one thing that is absolutely clear is
that designing such a system would be the work of many
months. It is not a candidate for a near-term solution of
the litigation problem.
2. My proposal does help solve the short-term
litigation problem
First, the proposal I have offered has the advantage,
noted above, of being functionally identical to the current
system. Thus, no procedural alterations would be required
to implement it.
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Second, a provisional ex post facto analysis suggests
that it would cover virtually all federal defendants, both
those who have been convicted and those who have not.
The version of the legislation that is now circulating
among congressional staff would make the bill applicable
to all sentencings occurring on or after its effective date.
Therefore, any defendant who has been convicted by plea
or trial, but not sentenced, would be covered. Similarly,
any defendant whose case is pending on direct appeal, but
is remanded for resentencing in light of Blakely, would
also be covered. In addition, any defendant who has not
yet been convicted would be covered.
The question that immediately arises is whether the
Ex Post Facto Clause would bar the application of new
legislation to many or all of the defendants to which the
legislative language would make it facially applicable. I
think not, for the following reasons.
i. It seems to me exceedingly unlikely that the
Supreme Court would, even if it finds the
Guidelines unconstitutional in a post-Blakely
ruling, make Blakely itself retroactive. Therefore,
any case that was sentenced and had completed
direct appeal before Blakely would be unaffected
and would not be eligible for collateral review.
ii. If Blakely is not retroactive, that also means that
persons who committed criminal conduct before
June 24, 2004 were lawfully subject to sentencing
under the Guidelines at the time of their offenses.
iii. The Ex Post Facto Clause does not prohibit
application of all after-enacted legislation to
defendants who committed their offenses before
the legislation. The Clause only prohibits
application of laws that disadvantage a defendant
in comparison to the law in effect at the time of
the crime.
iv. Therefore, any defendant who committed an
offense prior to June 24, 2004, and who wanted
to raise an Ex Post Facto challenge to sentencing
under the proposal I have offered would have to
establish that the new law would disadvantage
him as compared to the old Guidelines. Because
the proposal I have made would reinstitute the
Guidelines effectively unchanged, such an
arguments would fail in virtually every case. This
is so because the guidelines calculations leading
to determination of a sentencing range would be
identical before and after the legislative change.
The only difference in the new system is that it
would be theoretically easier for a judge to
sentence above what is now the top of the
guideline range, because doing so under the
current guidelines would require a "departure,"
while doing so under the revised system would
not. Thus, so long as the judge imposed a
sentence within the current guideline range, i.e.,
did not impose a sentence which under current
law would represent an upward departure, the
defendant would have no ground of complaint.
The new law would not disadvantage him, but
would instead restore the law in effect at the time
he committed the crime and generate a sentence
identical to the one to which he was subject when
he committed the crime.
v. Therefore, the only defendants who could not be
sentenced under the proposal on ex post facto
grounds would be defendants who committed
their crimes between the date on which Blakely
was decided and the date of enactment of the
proposal. This group is currently relatively small,
but it grows with each day that passes without
legislative action.
C. What happens if the Supreme Court blinks?
The final concern about acting now is the lingering doubt
that the Court will really follow Blakely to its logical
conclusion and invalidate the Guidelines. If they were to
do that, one would not want to have panicked and passed
a wholly new sentencing regime. From this perspective,
the beauty of the suggestion I have offered is precisely
that it is functionally indistinguishable from the existing
system. If the Court upheld the Guidelines, Congress
could immediately repeal the fix or let it sunset without
any material impact on life in the courts.
V. Conclusion
There remain real questions about whether to enact the
proposal I have made. If one wants the Guidelines to
be abolished, my proposal should not be enacted. If one
believes that a long period of crippling turmoil in the
courts is not too high a price to pay for the destruction of
the guideline system, my proposal should not be enacted.
If one believes that "Blakely-izing" the guideline system
would be a good thing, my proposal should not be enacted.
(Though I would implore prosecutors, defense counsel,
and particularly judges who favor Blakely-ization to take a
very long look at what it would really entail before arriving
at that conclusion. For judges in particular, Blakely-ization
seems to me to produce the very opposite of what judges
say they want because it would reduce judicial sentencing
discretion dramatically even in comparison to the existing
guidelines.)
If on the other hand, one favors the continuation of the
Guideline regime, a failure to proceed immediately not
only prolongs uncertainty in the courts, but decreases the
chances of successful legislation. And if one believes that
meaningful federal sentencing reform is more likely to re-
sult from an interim period of systemic stability than from
a period of politically volatile turmoil, one should seriously
consider pushing for the solution I have advanced.
Notes
Alternatively, perhaps only those Guidelines elements thought
particularly prejudicial to fair determination of guilt on the
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL. 16, NO. 5 • JUNE 2004
purely statutory elements would have to be bifurcated, but
that option would require a long, messy process of deciding
which Guidelines facts could be tried in the "guilt" phase and
which could be relegated to the bifurcated sentencing phase.
2 Unlike other conventional "elements" of a crime, "guidelines
elements" would presumably be subject to dismissal at any
point in the proceedings without prejudice to the defendant's
ultimate conviction of the core statutory offense. For
example, in a unitary trial system, if the government failed to
prove drug quantity in its case-in-chief, the drug quantity
"element" could (and presumably should) be dismissed
pursuant to the F.R.Cr. P. at the close of the government's
case without causing dismissal of the entire prosecution. By
contrast, a failure to prove the "intent to distribute" element
of a 21 U.S.C. § 841 "possession with intent to distribute"
case would require dismissal of the entire prosecution.
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